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Abstract
Beginning in the late 1990s, Canada and the United States began requiring
"Environmental Reviews (ERs)" of all trade agreements to be negotiated by each
government. This paper, commissioned by the North American Commission for
Environmental Cooperation, outlines how ERs have evolved in North America, and
evaluates the different methodological approaches that have been employed in ERs thus
far.  We show that the ERs conducted to date have an encouraging number of strengths
that can be built upon. However, we also establish that the art of conducting ERs is still
in its infancy.  We identify four limitations with the methodological approaches that have
been employed in the most recent ERs.  Based on an analysis of these limitations, we
propose four ways to improve how ERs are conducted in the future:
Summary
Beginning in the late 1990s, Canada and the United States began requiring
"Environmental Reviews (ERs)" of all trade agreements to be negotiated by each
government. The purpose of these reviews is to help identify potential environmental
effects of trade agreements, both positive and negative, in order to facilitate responses to
such effects throughout the negotiation and implementation processes. This paper
outlines how ERs have evolved in North America, and evaluates the different
methodological approaches that have been employed in ERs thus far.
We show that the ERs conducted to date have an encouraging number of strengths that
can be built upon. In both countries, ERs are becoming increasingly sophisticated in their
analyses.  Compared to earlier efforts, they have begun to apply rigorous quantitative and
qualitative techniques in the attempt to identify the potential environmental impacts of a
trade agreement.  In addition, ERs have brought unprecedented levels of public
participation into the trade policy-making process.
This paper also establishes that the art of conducting ERs reviews is still in its infancy.
We identify four limitations with the methodological approaches that have been
employed in the most recent ERs.
1.  Environmental Reviews for trade agreements that will involve relatively small
amounts of economic activity pay too little attention to analyzing the agreement's
potential marginal environmental costs.G-DAE Working Paper No. 02-01: “Economic Analysis in Environmental Reviews of Trade Agreements”
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2.  Environmental Reviews for trade agreements that are predicted to have "economy-
wide effects" base the core of their environmental assessments on estimates derived
from controversial economic modeling techniques.
3.  Environmental assessments that are based on estimates from economic modeling are
only as good as the economic models themselves.
4.  Many environmental issues do not lend themselves to quantitative analysis, and are
therefore largely ignored in the ER process.
Based on an analysis of these limitations, we propose four ways to improve how ERs are
conducted in the future:
1.   Broaden the scope of Environmental Reviews
The scope of ERs should be broadened to address two of the limitations discussed in this
paper: the problem of the "moving target," and the exclusive focus on domestic impacts.
2.  Expand the set of methodologies used to estimate economic impacts.
Comprehensive ERs should draw from a variety of methods to estimate the economic
impacts of proposed trade agreements.  For trade agreements that have potentially
substantial economy-wide effects, rather than relying solely on intricate CGE models to
form the "core" of their analyses, ERs should make use of simpler, more transparent
partial equilibrium, input-output analyses, and similar techniques to estimate the primary
and secondary effects of a proposed agreement.
3.  Increase the number of environmental variables that are assessed.
Environmental Reviews should expand the categories of environmental problems that
they seek to examine. Where ex-ante estimates of potential environmental effects are
impossible to consider, ex-post analyses, both quantitative and qualitative, should be
employed to fill in these gaps.
4.  Enhance existing levels of inter-governmental and public participation.
There should be a built-in response mechanism whereby final drafts of ERs discuss the
extent to which earlier public commentary has been incorporated into the final draft.G-DAE Working Paper No. 02-01: “Economic Analysis in Environmental Reviews of Trade Agreements”
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Environmental Reviews of Trade Agreements:
Assessing the North American Experience
1
I.  Introduction
We have entered a new era of trade policy-making in North America.  Whether in
the form of a new round of global trade negotiations, the proposed Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA), or the numerous ongoing bilateral talks with individual countries
around the world, all three North American countries are involved in multilateral,
regional, and bilateral trade negotiations.  A newcomer at the table is the emergence of
concern regarding trade policy's social and environmental ramifications.  In response to
that concern, North American governments have begun to formally require their
ministries to conduct "Environmental Reviews" or "Environmental Assessments" (ERs)
of proposed trade agreements.
This paper will outline how the process of ERs have evolved in North America,
and evaluate the different methodological approaches that have been employed in ERs
thus far.  The paper is organized into four parts.  After this short introduction, the second
section provides an overview of the origins and current form of ERs in North America.
In the third part, we analyze the strengths and weakness of current ER approaches.  Based
on that analysis, the concluding section offers recommendations for improvement in
future ERs.
II.  Environmental Reviews in North America
Environmental reviews of proposed trade agreements have a ten-year history in
North America.  What started out as somewhat ad-hoc responses to public pressure have
since developed into systematic mandates from the highest levels of authority.  While the
United States and Canada have conducted a number of ERs, at this writing, the
government of Mexico is not engaged in the ER process.  This section traces the origin of
ERs in North America and outlines the evolution and current state of ER methodologies.
The Process of Environmental Reviews
In response to pressure from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the US
and Canadian governments conducted their first environmental reviews in the early 1990s
(Montgomery, 2000; Beale, 2000).  These first reviews were of the (then proposed) North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the Uruguay Round.
                                                                
1 The authors would like to thank Regina Flores for her research assistance.  We would also like to thank
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In 1999, leading up to the Third Ministerial Meeting of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) held in Seattle, Washington, high-level officials from the US and
Canada issued decrees mandating that ERs become a regularly mandated component of
trade policy-making in each country.  In the United States, this took the form of
Executive Order number 13141, issued by President Clinton.  Canada issued the 1999
Cabinet Directive on the Environmental Assessment of Policy, Plan and Program
Proposals.  These mandates commit each government to conduct ERs of trade
agreements and provide policy-makers with the general guidelines from which to
proceed.
Table 1.  The Inter-Agency Process for Environmental Reviews





Nov 16, 1999 – Clinton
Cabinet Directive on the Environmental
Assessment of Policy, Plan and Program
Proposals, 1999
Lead Agency United States Trade Representative (USTR)
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)




Trade and Environmental Policy Advisory
Committee (TEPAC)
Sector Advisory Groups (SAGITS)
Interagency
Process





Environmental Assessment Committee for Trade
Negotiations
Interdepartmental Steering Committee chaired by
DFAIT includes representatives from:
     Environment Canada
     Environmental Assessment Agency
     Industry Canada
Public Input
Process
1. Federal Register Notices of intent to
conduct ER and request for comments on the
scope of ER (45 day public comment period)
2. Notice of availability of the draft ER
document and request for comments
3. Notice of availability of the final
environmental review document
4.  Final draft made public.
1. Canada Gazette Notices (45 day public
comment period) requesting for comments on the
scope of ER (coinciding with electronic, face to
face consultations, and regional multi-
stakeholder meetings)
2. Notice of availability of draft ER and request
for public comment.
3.Notice of availability of final document
4.Final draft made available to public.  Final
document summarizes previous comments and
how they were responded to.
Source: USTR, 2000; DFAIT, 2001.G-DAE Working Paper No. 02-01: “Economic Analysis in Environmental Reviews of Trade Agreements”
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In many ways ERs in the two countries are conducted in a similar manner.  Each
country puts together an inter-agency group to conduct an ER, holds a public comment
period to consider the scope that an ER should take, develops a methodology, conducts
the review, and releases it to the public.  Table 1 compares the ER process in the US and
Canada.  Both countries have high-level mandates, are led by ministries of trade but
involve other relevant agencies, and have elements of public participation.  The key
differences involve levels of participation.  Regarding governmental participation, on the
US side, the United States Trade Representative (USTR), in addition to the Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ) "oversee" the ER process.  For Canada, the Department of
Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) is the sole leader.  Both nations involve
the public in the ER process.  Each country calls for public commentary on the scope of
the ER and commentary on a first draft.
Both the United States and Canada conducted reviews for the North American
Free Trade Agreement, and the Uruguay Round of world trade negotiations.  While these
early efforts were pioneering in their own right, recent attempts at analyzing the potential
impacts of a trade agreement have become much more sophisticated.  In Canada, ERs
that have more recently been conducted, or that are scheduled for completion in the near
future, are reviews for the Canada-Chile FTA, Canada-Singapore FTA, Canada-Central
America FTA, Canada-Costa Rica FTA, the Free Area of the Americas (FTAA), and the
new round of global trade negotiations agreed to in Doha, Qatar.  For the US, recent and
forthcoming reviews are for the US-Jordan FTA, the US-Chile FTA, the FTAA, and the
built-in agenda on agriculture and services at the WTO.
Methodologies for Environmental Reviews
ERs are  ex ante evaluations, occurring before the proposed changes have
occurred.  Thus they are inherently different in methodology from ex post analyses.  After
the fact, it is possible to ask, “What did happen when a trade agreement was adopted?”
That is, actual historical data can be used in ex post analyses.  However, ERs clearly
cannot use historical data on the results of future trade agreements.  In place of historical
data, what is needed is the best possible projection of what might happen in the future.
For this reason, the intricacies of economic modeling techniques necessarily play a large
role in our discussion of ERs.
The methodologies employed to conduct ERs in the two countries are coming to
look increasingly similar.  There are typically four stages of an ER:
•  "scoping" of the relevant categories of environmental outcomes that should be
included in the ER;
•  assessment of the potential economic impacts of the proposed trade agreement;
•  evaluation of the subsequent potential environmental ramifications of those
economic changes; and
•  (in the US) an analysis of the potential effects on the US regulatory system that
may be triggered by the FTA.G-DAE Working Paper No. 02-01: “Economic Analysis in Environmental Reviews of Trade Agreements”
6
Scoping
Most environmental reviews begin by “scoping out” the main environmental
issues likely to arise as a result of the proposed negotiations (DFAIT, 2001).  The scoping
process usually includes three principal components:
(i)  evaluation of the likely outcome of trade negotiations;
(ii)  identification of potential resulting environmental impacts; and
(iii)  selection and prioritization of identified environmental impacts for review.
Therefore, the first step of the scoping process involves determining what the
probable outcome of the trade negotiation may be.  Such an estimate serves as the core of
projections for future economic and environmental assessment.  The second step focuses
on soliciting interagency and public input to determine the types of economic and
environmental impacts (both positive and negative) that could result from the proposed
trade agreement.  Some of these impacts are more serious than others, and budget, data,
and time constraints usually prohibit analysis of every impact; thus it is not normally
possible to analyze all the issues identified in the ER.  The final step of scoping then
selects and prioritizes the significant issues that should be analyzed to determine the
environmental consequences of the trade agreement. (USTR, 2000; DFAIT, 2001).
Assessing the economic effects
The level of methodological sophistication that is involved in predicting the
potential economic effects of a trade agreement depends on the scale of economic activity
between the proposed trading partners.  For smaller bilateral (and some regional)
agreements such as the Canada-Chile FTA or the US-Jordan agreement, fairly simple
economic techniques are often sufficient.  Larger agreements that have potential
economy-wide effects, such as the proposed FTAA and the new round of world trade
talks, are more likely to involve more complex economic modeling techniques.
When proposed agreements are relatively small in scale, analysts often only
consider what are sometimes referred to as the "primary" effects of the agreement, or
changes in sectors directly affected by the terms of the agreement.  Such an approach is
justified because the level of activity between the potential trading partners will not be
large.  Analyses of the primary effects essentially ask how exports and imports in key
sectors will expand or contract as a result of the proposed agreement.  Such estimates can
be a derived from simple examinations of historical trends and tariff rates, or by more
sophisticated partial equilibrium models.   An example of the former approach is the draft
ER for the proposed US-Chile FTA that was conducted by the USTR.  To examine the
potential effects of that agreement analysts simply examined the historical record of the
top 25 imports and exports and their respective tariff rates between the US and Chile
(USTR, 2001).   From such an examination it became fairly easy to predict which sectors
might enjoy expansion and contraction from trade liberalization between the two nations.
A partial equilibrium model focuses on certain sectors of the economy, but does
not attempt to represent the full range of interaction among all sectors.  Such an approachG-DAE Working Paper No. 02-01: “Economic Analysis in Environmental Reviews of Trade Agreements”
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allows policy analysts to isolate the effect of trade liberalization on particular sectors,
commodities, or pollutants in an economy and to test the significance of the relationship
between trade policy and the examined variable. Partial equilibrium assessments have
been used, for example, to examine the potential economic impacts of the US-Jordan
agreement.  These models assume, in effect, that the interactions between certain sectors
and the overall economy can be ignored in order to focus greater attention on the
workings of a particular sector itself.
When a proposed trade agreement, such as the FTAA or a new round of world
trade negotiations, has the potential for substantial effects throughout the economy, ERs
are beginning to rely on estimates from computational general equilibrium (CGE)
models.  In contrast to the partial equilibrium approach that looks at changes in one or a
small family of sectors, a CGE model attempts to present a quantitative picture, at a point
in time, of the interaction of the full range of markets and industries throughout an
economy. Like partial equilibrium models, the CGE approach involves an analysis of the
primary effects of the proposed agreement, but then adds two other layers of analysis.
We will refer to the three stages of effects as "primary," "secondary," and
"tertiary."  The secondary effects are the indirect, inter-industry consequences of the
primary effects, as calculated by input-output models.  The tertiary effects are the
economic equilibrium effects resulting from the primary and secondary effects.  For
example, when Mexico opens its markets to US corn under NAFTA, the primary effect
on the US is the increase in corn exports; the secondary effects include increased
purchases of farm inputs by corn growers; the tertiary effects include shifts in consumer
spending and employment patterns throughout the economy as a result of the changes in
incomes and prices in the farm and farm input sectors.
These stages are conceptually distinct, even if in practice somewhat collapsed into
each other. First, as discussed earlier there is the estimate of the primary economic effects
of trade liberalization.  What exports and imports expand, by how much, in each country?
What changes in production technology, organization, and ownership will occur?
Second, there are input-output (I-O) effects, as changes in final demand ripple through
supply chains and  intermediate goods producers.  If a policy change leads to the
production of fewer cars, I-O analysis can calculate the resulting decrease in auto
industry inputs from other sectors of the economy. Finally, there are equilibrating
changes, as markets readjust to  changed conditions, prices rise and fall, and labor
(hopefully) moves from declining industries to expanding ones.
For use in an ER the CGE model is run twice: once as a benchmark, representing
actual conditions in a recent “base year” without the proposed agreement; and again for
that same year, making the counterfactual assumption that the agreement was in effect
but other conditions remained unchanged.  In other words, the only difference between
the two model runs is that the proposed agreement is assumed to be in effect in the
second one.  The difference between the output of the two model runs is then taken to be
the impact of the proposed agreement.  Note that this is what economists call a
“comparative statics” analysis, contrasting two snapshots of economies in equilibrium.  ItG-DAE Working Paper No. 02-01: “Economic Analysis in Environmental Reviews of Trade Agreements”
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does not attempt to describe the time path of adjustment following adoption of a trade
agreement. Table 2 shows recent trade agreements where specific models have been
employed in ex ante analyses.  It is interesting to note that several models used for
analyses of NAFTA are now being adapted to estimate the effects of the FTAA.  Of these
models, GTAP, Michigan, Berkeley (IADB), Baylor, and the U.S. model, GTAP is one
that is slated to be part of an ER (USTR, 2000).
Table 2. Models used in recent ex ante






Computable General Equilibrium Models
GTAP • • • •
Berkeley • • • •
Michigan • • • •
Baylor • •










Formal economic modeling is a relatively recent methodological addition to
environmental reviews.  Previously, most environmental reviews were largely qualitative
in nature.  For example, the Canadian and U.S. environmental reviews of NAFTA and the
Uruguay Round focused on the expected economic outcomes using comparative
language, without relying on quantitative tools to estimate the economic changes from
pre-agreement conditions.  However, this strategy has been changing over the pastG-DAE Working Paper No. 02-01: “Economic Analysis in Environmental Reviews of Trade Agreements”
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decade. One of the first environmental reviews to employ quantitative methods was the
1990 EC evaluation of the EU, which linked the economic model HERMES to different
environmental impacts.  Later, the United States used COMPAS (Commercial Policy
Analysis System), a partial equilibrium model designed by the U.S. ITC, in its
environmental review of the U.S.-Jordan free trade agreement.  Today, the USTR
proposes using one of two models for the environmental review of the FTAA, including
GTAP and the U.S. Model.
Estimating environmental and regulatory effects
The final stages of an ER involve estimating the environmental and regulatory
effects of the anticipated economic changes triggered by the trade agreement.  In
estimating the subsequent environmental impacts of a trade policy change, early ERs
were largely qualitative in nature.  However, ERs are increasingly employing a range of
quantitative methodologies as well.
The environmental stage of an ER is performed at two levels.  First, commonly
called "sectoral" analyses, is an examination of the environmental effects of the economic
changes estimated in the economic stage of the ER.  Second is a regulatory assessment
that often seeks to identify text in the proposed agreement that could potentially affect the
ability of a country to enact, maintain, or enforce its regulations pertaining to the
environment.
A range of approaches is used for the sectoral analyses.  In general, the key
sectors that are thought likely to undergo significant economic changes as a result of the
agreement are analyzed for their potential environmental effects.  For example, if it was
predicted that a nation's mining sector might significantly expand as a result of an
agreement, an ER might assess the amount and location of increased water use and
pollution in that sector.  Alternatively, economic analyses could determine that an
expansion of a nation's pulp and paper industry would occur.  ER analysts would then
look at the changes and location of industrial air pollution as a result of those changes as
well.  Subsequently, an assessment of a nation's regulatory capacity to absorb these
effects is conducted. In other words, it is asked whether the nation is equipped with the
necessary laws and incentives to abate the anticipated environmental effects.  In the
USTR's draft ER of the proposed US-Chile FTA, for instance, it was determined that the
US-Chile FTA would lead to small changes in the production in hazardous wastes.  It was
then determined that the US Resource, Conservation, and Recovery Act (RCRA) had the
capacity to address those small changes (USTR, 2001).
Sectoral analyses are beginning to be conducted at higher levels of quantitative
sophistication.  In Canada and the US alike, there are growing amounts of quantitative
data on levels of environmental degradation in specific sectors of the economy.  For
example, estimates are available for the amount of air pollution per unit of output in
specific industrial sectors.  Such data are increasingly used as coefficients that are linked
to the economic results performed earlier in ERs.  Later in this paper we will show how
economic estimates derived from a CGE model were used to predict increases in sulfur
dioxide pollution in the North American metals sector.G-DAE Working Paper No. 02-01: “Economic Analysis in Environmental Reviews of Trade Agreements”
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Building on this approach, a number of models that can derive environmental
predictions based on inputs from economic analyses have been proposed for use in future
ERs in North America. The Economic Research Service of the USDA has created another
model, called the Future Agricultural Resources Model, or FARM.  This model combines
a geographical information system with a computable general equilibrium economic
model (using GTAP) that simulates changes in the use of land and water resources for the
United States and the Western Hemisphere.  This model has been proposed by the USTR
for analyzing potential impacts from an FTAA, along with the United States Regional
Agricultural Model (USRAM) of the ERS and the Trade Environment Analysis Models
(TEAM) of the EPA (USTR, 2000).  What will also be very useful in the future will be
the assessment of an environmental baseline for the United States.  Such an analysis can
serve as a control, representing what would have happened without a trade policy change.
The other environmental component of an ER is often referred to as the
Regulatory Review.  Regulatory analyses in earlier ERs primarily focused on responding
to trade and environmental regulatory hypothesis such as the pollution haven hypothesis.
This has changed in more recent reviews, which look at proposed text in the agreement
being negotiated in an attempt to identify language that could possible affect a nation's
ability to develop, enforce, or maintain its levels of environmental regulation.
Contemporary trade agreements now often include provisions that extend well
beyond changes in tariffs.  Indeed, it is likely that a trade agreement will also have
chapters on financial services, intellectual property, investment, competition policy,
government procurement, and other matters.  For this reason, the regulatory review
portion of an ER can be rather lengthy. Legal experts conduct a thorough examination of
the language of the text to determine the potential conflicts between the two legal
regimes.  Past reviews, such as the Canadian and US ERs for NAFTA, examined
regulatory, trade, and environmental hypothesis.  In each of these reviews, a literature
review of the empirical evidence regarding the pollution-haven hypothesis determined
that the US and Canada did not have to be concerned about the possibility of a race to the
bottom in North American environmental standards.
III.  Strengths and Weaknesses of Recent Reviews
The state of the art of ERs in North America has evolved a great deal in the past
decade.  However, a number of improvements still need to be made in order for ERs to be
of optimal use to policy-makers.  This section of the paper identifies the stronger aspects
of the most recent reviews, and also highlights areas that continue to be relatively weak.
There are two major parts to this section.  First, we outline the strengths and weaknesses
of current ER approaches to estimate the economic impacts of a trade agreement; then we
evaluate the relative merits of the subsequent environmental assessment techniques.G-DAE Working Paper No. 02-01: “Economic Analysis in Environmental Reviews of Trade Agreements”
11
Economic Modeling for ex ante Environmental Reviews
As trade agreements become more complex, involving many countries and sectors
of an economy, efforts to predict their economic outcome become more controversial. In
contrast, the modeling techniques used in ERs for smaller trade agreements that will not
entail major changes in economic activity are non-controversial.  Indeed, for ERs that
concerned trade deals with countries like Jordan and Chile, the level of economic analysis
that was conducted was adequate and appropriate.  The major limitation of economic
models for ERs comes in the analysis of larger trade agreements.  Such reviews inherit
the many controversies surrounding the predictive capability of CGE models, and
therefore their utility for policy-makers is more limited.
Because North American governments will be involved in conducting ERs for
proposed agreements with potentially large economy-wide effects, particularly for the
FTAA and a new round of world trade negotiations, we will spend the majority of our
attention here on the weaknesses of the economy-wide modeling efforts that will form the
core of those ERs.  In the last section of this report, we propose alternative, less
controversial, ways to capture these effects.
As discussed above, the most common modeling technique for estimating the
economic impacts of a trade agreement with suspected economy-wide effects involves
CGE models.  While this technique has strengths that other models fail to offer, it also
suffers from several weaknesses.  For these reasons, the results from CGE analyses
should be taken with caution and should not be relied on as the sole source of information
from which to base an ER.
The strengths of CGE models include their theoretical rigor, their ability to
represent the direct and indirect interactions among all sectors of the economy, and their
precise, detailed quantitative results.  CGE models are rigorously derived from economic
theory, assuming that markets respond to prices in the expected manner – excess demand
pushes prices up, excess supply pushes prices down.  Changes in one market affect other
markets as well; the general equilibrium, for which the model is named, occurs when a
set of prices is reached at which supply equals demand in all markets at the same time.
CGE models incorporate the interactions among all sectors of the economy.
Some interactions result from supply chains: more demand for automobiles implies more
purchases of tires and window glass by auto companies.  Others result from price and
income effects: higher prices for cars imply that fewer people will buy them, while higher
wages for autoworkers imply more spending on consumer goods.  CGE models provide
consistent sets of equations to analyze all such interrelationships.  Once constructed,
these powerful tools can run different simulations to consider alternative policies. They
incorporate multiple markets (for factors of production, final goods and services, or even
marketed environmental instruments), and are able to quantify efficiency and distributive
impacts of economic and/or environmental policies (de Miguel and Nuñez, 2001).
Another contribution of CGE models to environmental reviews is that they
respond to the need for quantitative tools (Waverman, 1992).  Trade agreements canG-DAE Working Paper No. 02-01: “Economic Analysis in Environmental Reviews of Trade Agreements”
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potentially affect all economic sectors, and create a mix of positive and negative effects
on labor markets, consumer welfare, and environmental media including air, water, land,
and biodiversity.  It is important to improve the understanding of the linkages between
trade policy reform and the environment, and quantifying their significance is an
important part of the analysis.  Quantification improves the possibility of correctly
anticipating the size of predicted environmental impacts, and facilitates the scoping stage
in assigning their relative importance.  It also allows a more meaningful debate about the
potential costs and benefits of a proposed trade-related reform (Anderson and Strutt,
1996).
CGE models, while offering the ability to demonstrate potential economic effects
ex ante of a proposed trade agreement, also have a number of less familiar but important
limitations.  We can group these limits into three categories: high information costs and
lack of transparency; controversial assumptions regarding model relationships; and the
inability to capture "non-trade" aspects of trade liberalization.
1.  High information costs and lack of transparency
At its core, building a CGE model is a cumbersome and expensive task, requiring
a great deal of time, substantial effort from a team of specialists, and considerable
resources, especially with respect to data.  Given the large data requirements,
disaggregated models become problematic because for every sector it is necessary to
examine its direct relationship with every other sector.  Even in a highly aggregated, 25-
sector model there are 300 distinct pairs of sectors whose relationships must be
considered; with 50 sectors there are more than 1,000 pairs to consider; with 100 sectors
there are nearly 5,000 pairs.
2  Adding a level of disaggregation causes a more than
proportional increase in data and parameter requirements (Munk, 1990).
The expense of building adequate data sets means that they can only be
infrequently updated; the resulting reliance on aged data puts policy analyses at risk of
being outdated before they are even completed.  For example, as of 2001 the most recent
version of the GTAP data set (GTAP 5) uses 1997 as a base year.  Other models have
been known to use base years as much as ten years out of date; GTAP is probably as
current as possible given the size of its data set. However, analyses that use this data can
only tell policymakers what would have happened if the policy change had occurred in
1997, not in the present or future.  That is, an ex ante analysis of the effects of the FTAA
using such a data set does not actually project what will happen, in 2005 or later, if the
FTAA is adopted.  Rather, it is examining what would have happened if the FTAA had
somehow been transported back in time, and dropped into the economy of 1997
(Ackerman et al. 2001).
This inescapable obsolescence can be a serious problem.  In an ex ante situation,
proposals during trade negotiations are always changing, as are the base conditions for
                                                                
2 With n sectors there are n(n-1)/2 distinct pairs of sectors in the model.G-DAE Working Paper No. 02-01: “Economic Analysis in Environmental Reviews of Trade Agreements”
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creating the model.  As a result, any economic assessment is in constant danger of being
rendered irrelevant should the direction of negotiations or economic conditions change
(UNEP, 2001). This was an issue for early NAFTA modelers, because in the late 1980s
and early 1990s the Mexican economy was changing so rapidly that models calibrated to
any fixed base year soon became inaccurate (Waverman, 1992 ).
A modeler’s analysis is only as good as the quality and quantity of data available.
However, due to the large data requirements it has become commonplace to synthesize
data from multiple published data sources. Although these data sets are assembled
carefully by skilled technicians, there is always a risk that some of the data sources
employ assumptions or definitions that are incompatible with the model scenarios. Use of
incompatible or biased data sources can create a host of problems, potentially even
undermining model calibration and the relevance of the model results (Laird, 1997;
Waverman, 1992).
High information costs lead to a lack of transparency in CGE models; ironically
the problem can arise from either too little detail or too much.  On the one hand, cost
constraints and the desire to keep models simple can lead to highly aggregated models
with relatively few sectors, relying on numerous simplifying assumptions.  Models of this
variety can be difficult to interpret since their results are shaped by the degree of
aggregation and the nature of the simplifying assumptions (Gallagher and Ackerman,
2000).  Moreover, a simple, highly aggregated model often lacks the detailed forecasts
that policy makers need.
On the other hand, a more disaggregated model, with sufficient detail for policy
analyses, can be difficult for anyone but an expert in the field to follow.  The number of
intersectoral relationships, as we have seen, grows much faster than the number of
sectors.  Comprehending and evaluating a model with hundreds of sectors and thousands
of potential interactions is a challenge even for another expert on CGE  models, and
essentially impossible for non-specialists.
3
It is not obvious that there is any happy medium between too little disaggregation
and too much; instead, there is some danger that both problems could occur at once in a
medium-sized model.
2. Controversial assumptions regarding model relationships.
While CGE models pride themselves on their rigorous grounding in economic
theory, this does not mean that they have escaped from controversy about their economic
assumptions and relationships.  Economic theory unfortunately does not provide clear,
unambiguous guidance on how to model a complex, modern economy; on the contrary,
theory suggests several reasons to question standard CGE approaches.  Questions that
will be addressed here include the limitations of the static framework, the reliance on
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textbook-style “perfect competition”, and the lack of established empirical estimates for
key relationships.
a) Limitations of static analysis
As we have seen, most CGE models rely on comparative-static analysis,
contrasting a scenario representing a hypothetical policy change to actual conditions in a
fixed base year. Both the base year and the policy scenario are represented as static
“snapshots,” with no provision for gradual adjustment or change over time.  When the
new policy is introduced, the model jumps directly to the resulting new equilibrium.
In practice, however, we are often extremely interested in the process of
adjustment following introduction of a new policy.  If labor, for example, is eventually
going to end up in new industries (in a new “general equilibrium”), it makes a great deal
of difference to know whether it takes 10 weeks, 10 months, or 10 years for workers to
change occupations following a shift in economic structure.  Lacking the ability to model
the pace of change, in labor markets or elsewhere, comparative static analyses have
proved most useful for examining short-term issues (Munk 1990; see also Tims 1990).
To address such questions, a dynamic model would be needed. Unfortunately,
CGE models are poorly suited for dynamic analysis. The data requirements are
significantly greater for a dynamic analysis, and dynamic models are much more unstable
and difficult to solve (i.e., iterative solutions do not always converge), even for the best
computers.
The issue goes beyond the practical limitations of existing computers.  The
abstract theoretical rigor of general equilibrium is limited to static analysis, and is silent
on questions of adjustment over time. Economic theorists have known since the 1970s
that general equilibrium is seriously flawed as a model of economic dynamics, with the
apparently inescapable potential for unstable or chaotic outcomes.
4 Ironically, many
advanced theorists have moved away from the general equilibrium framework at the
same time that it has become the norm in applied economics.
b) Reliance on perfect competition
Economists have a strange relationship with the familiar theory of “perfect
competition,” in which markets are populated exclusively by very competitive firms, all
of whom are too small to exert any independent power over prices.  On the one hand, the
theory is easy to analyze; in perfect competition the market leads to ideal outcomes,
which cannot be improved on by government intervention.  On the other hand, it is
obvious that the theory does not describe the market economy as it actually exists; perfect
competition among small, powerless firms does not characterize the likes of Microsoft,
General Motors, AOL Time Warner, and ExxonMobil.
                                                                
4 The extensive technical literature on this question, based on the so-called Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu
Theorem (proved in 1974) and subsequent related research, is well-known to economic theorists but almost
no one else.  For a summary from an economist’s point of view see Kirman 1989; for a summary by a
mathematician who has been active in this area see Saari 1995.  For a literature review with more complete
citations see Ackerman 2002.G-DAE Working Paper No. 02-01: “Economic Analysis in Environmental Reviews of Trade Agreements”
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In building CGE models, the mathematical convenience of familiar theories such
as perfect competition has often won out over realism about market imperfections. A
study of the CGE models used for economic analysis of NAFTA found that many were
arguably erroneous and easily challenged when compared to the real world (Stanford,
1993).  The models’ debatable assumptions include the idea that factor markets, including
labor markets, are perfectly competitive and will always clear (i.e., markets always return
to equilibrium, or full employment, after an external shock).  The models tend to ignore
the impacts on income distribution of socio-economic institutions such as trade unions,
minimum wages, and social programs. Conversely, they assume that the distribution of
income has no effect on aggregate economic performance. A common assumption is that
the aggregate economy is supply-constrained, so that output is limited only by the
availability of productive factors; this makes it impossible to model unemployment and
recessions. Some NAFTA models even assumed that there is no capital mobility between
North American countries, only within a country; no country in such a model can be
threatened with a loss of capital, and all gains in foreign investment come from outside of
the region.
The literature on critiques of perfect competition is itself extensive, raising many
reasons why these theories are inappropriate or inaccurate representations of real
economies.  Among the most important recent contributions is the analysis of the
economics of limited information.  Three economists who have worked in this area
shared the Nobel Prize in economics for 2001.  The best known of the three is Joseph
Stiglitz, formerly the chief economist for the World Bank, and the chair of the President’s
Council of Economic Advisors in the Clinton administration.  Stiglitz argues that the fatal
flaw of traditional economic theory is its assumption that everyone has perfect
information about all goods and services (see Stiglitz 2000 and numerous sources cited
there).  No one could possibly have that much information, Stiglitz points out, let alone
update it as the market changes.  An economy of limited information behaves very
differently from the traditional theoretical model; Stiglitz demonstrates that the theory of
perfect competition and perfect information (the standard basis for CGE models) is not
even a good approximation to the behavior of a realistic, limited-information economy.
c) Lack of established empirical relationships
One of the important strengths of CGE models is their explicit treatment of the
interactions between different economic sectors.  It is this feature that allows analysis of
indirect,  intersectoral effects of trade policies.  However, the models’  estimates of
indirect effects inevitably rest on assumptions about the exact shape and strength of
numerous relationships, such as the price elasticities of supply and demand in various
industries, or the speed and completeness with which markets adjust to external shocks.
The economics literature does not provide a single set of widely accepted estimates of
these parameters; CGE model relationships cannot be based on a professional consensus
about the empirical strength of price elasticities and market responses, because there is no
such consensus. Indeed, many of the models that predicted the effects of NAFTA used
elasticities estimated on the basis of U.S. trade with the whole world in the 1980s (not
with Mexico and Canada in the 1990s), averaged across separate industries whereG-DAE Working Paper No. 02-01: “Economic Analysis in Environmental Reviews of Trade Agreements”
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necessary due to mismatched SIC code lists, etc., and arbitrarily rounded upward in some
cases because the model is unstable with low elasticities (Hinajosa-Ojeda, 2000).
This is the opposite of the situation in many areas of physical sciences and
engineering, where physical relationships are based upon well-established natural laws
and have withstood repeated empirical tests.  Everyone doing rocket science uses exactly
the same model of gravity – but economics is not rocket science, and every CGE model
has its own picture of labor and product markets. The key assumptions differ in detail
from one model to the next, precisely because there is no one model that has proved to be
reliably more accurate than others in practice.
3. Inability to capture "non-trade" aspects of trade liberalization.
Recent trends in multilateral trade agreements have been to move beyond tariff
reductions and dismantling non-tariff barriers.  The new trade agenda focuses on building
trade regimes that include trade related issues such as international property rights,
investment, government procurement, and services.  Although the economic impacts of
these provisions will be significant, it is difficult to model them in a CGE framework.
This is especially problematic for environmental reviews if these “non-trade” provisions
will create environmental impacts.
Most important in this respect is the inability of CGE models to capture
investment effects (CEPAL, 2001). Proposed changes in investment rules could have a
significant impact on economic activity throughout the hemisphere.  According to the
World Bank, annual net foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows into Mexico more than
tripled after NAFTA was passed, reaching over $10 billion in 1998. In addition to
altering the composition and output of different sectors in Mexico, such inflows have
altered the trade orientation of many sectors as well.  Changes in investment rules under
NAFTA have reshaped intra and inter industry trade in North America, and changes in
future investment regimes are likely to do the same.  Increases in FDI have direct impacts
on technology choice and environmental quality. Investment-related changes to trade
patterns of this kind are of potentially great importance, but are beyond the scope of CGE
models.
One of the dangers in using CGE models for economic analyses is that they are
“oversold” as definitive predictors of how the entire economy may change after a trade
agreement.  In fact, the accomplishments of such models are much more modest.   A
CGE model is only analyzing how a proposed agreement might affect an economy via
changes in trade barriers, while holding everything else, including policy toward
investment and services, constant.  If the limitations of the modeling exercise are kept in
mind, it may provide useful information; if it is presented as the beginning and end of
economic analysis of a trade agreement, it may prove misleading.
Scott (2000) notes that in many of the ex ante analyses of NAFTA, the authors
pointed to the growth in U.S. exports without adequately highlighting the concurrent
growth in imports.  In a 1992 study designed to highlight some of the expected economicG-DAE Working Paper No. 02-01: “Economic Analysis in Environmental Reviews of Trade Agreements”
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benefits from NAFTA, the Michigan model predicted that U.S. exporters would benefit
more than their Mexican counterparts.  Exports from the U.S. to Mexico were forecast to
increase by $4.2 billion per year, while imports from Mexico would grow only $3.5
billion per year (Brown et al. 1992).  A later  ex post assessment showed that these
forecasts were gross underestimates, and wrong about the balance of trade as well. U.S.
exports to Mexico grew by an average of $8.3 billion per year, while imports from
Mexico grew by $13.5 billion per year.  The result was that the U.S. trade deficit with
Mexico almost quadrupled, jumping from $16.6 billion in 1993 to $62.8 billion in 2000
(Scott, 2000).  Although NAFTA was not solely responsible for these changes, the results
dramatize the extent to which CGE model output can provide misleading forecasts.
The impact on labor in the U.S. from Mexican imports was another highly
charged pre-NAFTA debate, which even today generates ongoing controversy among
economists.  For example, one ex ante model showed that U.S. employment would fall by
234,000 workers after NAFTA; most of this was assumed to be a return flow of illegal
immigrants to Mexico since Mexican employment was predicted to increase by 273,000
(Hinojosa-Ojeda 1992).  At first glance this looks close to some views of what actually
happened: a later ex post model by the same author showed that in the U.S. 259,000 jobs
were lost as a result of increased Mexican imports, and the U.S. Department of Labor
reported that 238,051 workers were certified under the NAFTA-TAA to have lost their
jobs due to trade with Mexico (Hinojosa-Ojeda 2000).
However, these ex post results refer to different workers than the ex ante model:
illegal immigrants who returned to Mexico did not get certified under NAFTA-TAA for
job loss in the U.S.  If, in addition to 238,000 certified job losses by U.S. workers, there
were other U.S. job losers who did not get certified, and a large number of undocumented
Mexican immigrants who lost their U.S. jobs and returned to Mexico, then the true
employment impact must have been much greater (and surprisingly hard to measure).   A
different ex post analysis of U.S.-Mexican trade since NAFTA found that what we have
called the primary and secondary effects of that trade caused the loss of 766,030 U.S.
jobs, though the impact was of course offset by the growth of the U.S. economy in the
late 1990s (Scott 2000).
The disparity between these numbers shows that even after NAFTA, there is no
agreement on the full effects, both due to methodological issues of the studies, and the
other economic factors that impacted U.S. employment.  Before future economic analyses
are conducted with the same models that were used to predict the outcomes of NAFTA, a
thorough evaluation of their NAFTA predictions should be undertaken.
Environmental modeling: analysis or afterthought?
Once the economic forecasts have been made, the predicted changes must be
matched up with environmental indicators, to see how the economic changes might
directly affect environmental quality.  In many ways, this is the most important part of
the process, but it is not always treated with the same level of effort and sophistication as
the economic component.  In some of the simple cases marginal environmental impacts
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studies, environmental analysis is in danger of being treated as an afterthought tacked
onto the results of CGE models.
The central limitation of the environmental component of ERs for relatively small
trade agreements is that they largely ignore the potential marginal environmental costs of
the proposed agreement.  What  drives a large country's interest in negotiating trade
agreements with smaller countries are the marginal benefits that will accrue to the
economy.  The methodologies used to estimate marginal economic benefits in many
reviews have been thorough and detailed.  However, much less attention has been paid to
the agreements’ possible marginal environmental costs.  Too often ERs claim that since
changes in economic activity will be small, the resulting environmental changes will be
insignificant.
In ERs for big trade agreements, typically, environmental analysis is based on
identifying and measuring the impact of economic changes on environmental media.
Coefficients are established for pollution emitted per unit of output for a particular
economic sector. These coefficients can then be applied to the economic output of the
CGE models to determine how changes in patterns of production due to the proposed
trade agreement might impact the environment.  The technique is most successful with
quantifiable, readily measured impacts, such as the levels of air pollutants associated with
particular manufacturing industries, or with transportation.  Water quality and water use
is another area where this technique has been widely used.  It is easy to link levels of
water pollution to industrial output in certain sectors (e.g., chemicals, paper, or intensive
agriculture) or water use to acreage of irrigated agricultural production.
Agriculture plays a prominent role in assessments of trade agreements, and some
(not all) environmental models used in ERs focus solely on the agricultural sector. The
United States Regional Agricultural Model (USRAM), from the USDA, provides
estimated changes in embodied energy, soil loss from wind and water erosion, offsite cost
of soil erosion, nitrogen and phosphorus losses, carbon flux and greenhouse gas
emissions.  The Trade Environment Analysis Models (TEAM) from the USEPA can
track the total pollutant emissions for the entire United States (USTR, 2000).
When environmental models contain sufficient spatial detail, it is possible to use
geographical information systems (GIS) technology to estimate the location as well as the
magnitude of environmental impacts. For example, the Future Agricultural Resources
Model (FARM) of the USDA uses GIS to simulate changes in the use of land and water
resources for the United States and the Western Hemisphere, including land-use shifts
between cropland, grassland, forestland, and other land; changes in crop yields, stocking
rates, and timber harvest rates; and transfers of water between irrigation and other uses.
Other models that attempt to link economic output to pollution emissions at the
intermediate and final consumption level is the  Trade and Environment Equilibrium
Analysis (TEQUILA) model, from the OECD.  This model was adapted to Mexico from
the OECD Development Center’s prototype CGE model (NACEC, 1999).G-DAE Working Paper No. 02-01: “Economic Analysis in Environmental Reviews of Trade Agreements”
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However, despite these promising tools there are three ways in which the
environmental modeling phase of an ER can go wrong.  First, if it relies solely or directly
on an economic forecast that proves to be incorrect, then the environmental projections
will be incorrect as well.  Second, there may be technical flaws in the calculation of the
model’s environmental coefficients.  Finally, current environmental modeling approaches
have the ability to capture only a limited set of environmental problems. Both the
problems of aggregation and the obstacles to quantification lead to slighting or excluding
important categories of impacts.
The first problem is illustrated by a study that used a version of the Michigan
model to estimate the potential impacts of NAFTA on industrial pollution in Canada,
Mexico, and the US.  The study multiplied CGE estimates of employment growth in
industrial sectors in the three countries by a variety of pollution intensity coefficients.
Table 3 presents the study’s ex ante estimates for post-NAFTA changes in SO2 emissions
in the base metals sector (including iron, steel, and nonferrous primary metals), compared
to actual or ex post changes.
5  The model predicted large increases in SO2 emissions,
because it predicted large increases in the sector’s output and employment in all three
countries.  However, employment in the base metals sector actually declined in Canada
and Mexico, and increased by about two-thirds of the predicted amount in the U.S.  To
obtain the “actual” data shown in Table 3 we multiplied the levels of employment growth
that actually occurred in the sector by the same pollution coefficients used in the study.
Table 3. Conflicting Estimates on Environment and Trade:
Base Metals in North America
Change in SO2 Emissions from Base









Sources: Forecast is from Reinert and Roland-
Holst, 2000; actual is authors’ calculations from
UNIDO, 2001 (explained in text).
The second problem, indirectly present in the same study, is subtler, and the
details are beyond the scope of this paper.  The study used the same coefficients for all
three countries, calculated by the World Bank based on pollution per employee in US
                                                                
5 The study used a 1991 base year, and estimated changes due to NAFTA, without specifying a specific
post-NAFTA year.  We calculated the ex post change between 1991 and 1998.G-DAE Working Paper No. 02-01: “Economic Analysis in Environmental Reviews of Trade Agreements”
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industry in 1987.  Briefly, the use of employment as an indicator of economic activity
and calculation of pollution per employee are problematic, since employment does not
have a direct causal relationship to emissions.  Also, rapid technological change and
environmental improvement in all three countries in the last 14 years makes the
coefficients based on 1987 emissions particularly inappropriate (Gallagher, 2002;
Repellin-Hill, 1999).  Better industrial pollution coefficients for Mexico, expressing
pollution per unit of value added in 1997, have recently been published, making it
possible to overcome this problem (Aguayo et al., 2001).
The third problem in the environmental modeling phase of ERs is the tendency to
minimize or overlook important categories of impacts. This occurs for two different
reasons.   First, the aggregation of economic data may bury an environmentally sensitive
activity in a larger sector.  Emissions that result only from aluminum production  (to take
a strictly hypothetical example) would be easy to see and to analyze in a model that
disaggregates different metal industries. Now consider the treatment of the same
emissions in a model that aggregates all primary metal producers into a single sector.
Most metal production is not aluminum (iron and steel is a much larger industry), so the
relationship between the emissions and metal production in general would look quite
weak.  The model results would not provide guidance about the causes of emissions or
the strategies for reduction, due to excessive aggregation.
This problem is endemic: establishing clear linkages between economic trade-
related changes and the resulting direct and indirect environmental effects is complicated
by the mismatch of the optimal scale for studying the two subjects. In a review of
economic and environmental model methodologies for the OECD, Dale Ervin observes,
“Economic analyses conducted at the local/watershed level may omit
important forces that are determined in the larger market context; for
example, product and input price changes that alter land rents, or shifts in
output mix that alter processing patterns.  In contrast, environmental
analyses have more integrity if they are conducted in disaggregated
fashion, usually for the watershed or ecosystem that shares common
environmental processes” (Ervin, 1999, 121).
Paraphrasing Ervin, he argues that economic analyses are best performed at a
level that is too aggregated to capture many important environmental impacts.
Impacts may also be missed because they are excluded from the scope of
assessment.  Some of the limitations on the scope of ERs are intentional, as in the
decision to restrict some U.S. analyses to impacts within the country.  This prevents
analysis of the “pollution haven” hypothesis, i.e. the possibility that polluting activities
are relocating to countries that have less strict regulation.  Since the argument for trade
agreements is usually that they benefit all parties together, it seems appropriate to analyze
their environmental impacts on all participating countries.G-DAE Working Paper No. 02-01: “Economic Analysis in Environmental Reviews of Trade Agreements”
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Some of the limitations on scope of assessments may simply reflect limited
resources for modeling.  In the suite of U.S. models discussed above, although FARM,
RAM and TEAM each covers multiple economic sectors and a variety of environmental
issues, the fact remains that none is comprehensive enough to include all areas. Of these
three models, two are designed to assess land and resource use and degradation within a
specific sector, agriculture.  The third, while a bit more comprehensive in scope, does not
cover issues of land use, invasive species, protected species and  depletable natural
resources.  The fact that no model includes all sectors underscores the need for use of
multiple methodologies in the assessment of environmental impacts, as well as
continuing development of more comprehensive approaches (USTR, 2000).
The most challenging limitations on the scope of environmental assessment
reflect the difficulty of quantifying some important impacts, such as nature conservation
and biodiversity (Beghin  et al. 1997).  This can be contrasted with the discussion of
sulfur emissions from industry associated with Table 3 above, one of the best cases for
quantification.  Whatever the merits of any specific coefficient, it is clearly meaningful to
talk about a numerical value for quantity of emissions per unit of production.  Common
sense suggests that, with twice as much production and unchanged technology, there will
be twice as much sulfur emissions.
Now consider the different situation that arises with unquantifiable impacts, such
as loss of biodiversity.  In a recent study of the corn trade under NAFTA, Alejandro
Nadal argues that U.S. exports, which are displacing traditional Mexican producers,
threatens the survival of ancestral genetic stocks of maize, which originated in Mexico
and Central America (Nadal 2000).  Without arguing the merits of this question, one can
conclude that,  if  Nadal’s argument is correct, he has identified an important but
unquantifiable impact.  There is no way to attach a “biodiversity loss coefficient” to
Mexico’s imports of corn; but loss of biodiversity could nonetheless be a crucial impact
of trade.
In addition to the lack of attention to certain sets of environmental problems,
many NGOs have commented that ERs should address a broader range of social concerns
such as social displacement, income inequality, and so forth (DFAIT, 2000; NGO letter,
2001).  The problems that arise in evaluating these broader questions of sustainability are
parallel to those for biodiversity – the impacts are important, but they cannot be attached
to economic model results with a simple coefficient, as in the case of sulfur emissions.
The difficulties in linking CGE and environmental models that have been
highlighted here do not mean that this exercise is invalid.  Rather, it is meant to show that
this is an evolving science, that there are limits inherent in the nature of the models, and
that these limits have created formidable methodological obstacles to overcome.
Nevertheless, progress has been made in recent years.  One activity that would help
promote this recent progress would be to conduct more  ex post assessments of the
environmental effects of earlier trade agreements, and compare the outcomes to the ex
ante environmental reviews in order to determine which models worked well, and for
which sectors and environmental issues.G-DAE Working Paper No. 02-01: “Economic Analysis in Environmental Reviews of Trade Agreements”
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IV.  Toward More Comprehensive Environmental Reviews for North America
Environmental  Reviews of proposed trade agreements form an essential new
component of trade policy-making in North America.  This paper has established that the
art of conducting such reviews is still in its infancy.  However, we have also shown that
the ERs conducted to date have an encouraging number of strengths that can be built
upon. This section of the paper suggests specific steps that policy-makers can take to
enable the environmental review process to become more comprehensive and useful for
trade negotiations.
The overarching framework that has been used in past reviews is a useful one that
provides a good starting point.  We have noted that virtually all past ERs in North
America have had three major components: a determination of the scope that the ER will
take; an estimation of the economic impact of proposed trade policy changes; and
estimates of the subsequent environmental ramifications induced by such economic
impacts.  In addition, most ERs have included maintained a commitment to inter-
governmental and public participation throughout the review process. In this section we
propose ways in which each of these areas – scoping, economic analysis, environmental
analysis, and public participation – can be improved upon.  Finally, it is important for
Mexico, a country engaged in a flurry of trade negotiations, to start conducting ERs of
those negotiations.
1.  Broaden the scope of Environmental Reviews
          Environmental reviews should encompass the broadest possible scope within time
and feasibility constraints. The scope of ERs should be broadened to address two of the
limitations that have been discussed earlier in this paper: the problem of the "moving
target," and the exclusive focus on domestic impacts.
The "moving target" problem is crucial to the validity of the analysis.  If an ER is
based on an estimated outcome of a trade negotiation that proves to be erroneous or
incomplete, the entire effort will have little applicability to the policy process.  Taking the
lead from other aspects of Canada's 1992 NAFTA report, we recommend that a scenario
approach be taken.  Conducting ERs based on a range of possibilities would grant trade
policy-makers the flexibility to consider the environmental impacts of various proposals,
both before and during the negotiation process.  
Of course, the construction of scenarios for an ER would take different forms for
different agreements.  To provide a framework then, we propose the following.   Through
discussions with informed trade negotiators and experts both within and outside of the
nations conducting ERs, a range of possible or probable outcomes could be constructed.
For example, a hypothesized ER of a new round of WTO negotiations, including China’s
accession, could include a scenario with the introduction of investment provisions,G-DAE Working Paper No. 02-01: “Economic Analysis in Environmental Reviews of Trade Agreements”
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another with significant progress made on negotiations for agricultural subsides, and the
default case of no major new policy changes accompanying China's accession.
In addition to addressing the "moving target" problem, it is also in the interest of
North American nations to consider the potential environmental impacts on proposed
trading partners.   This is important for four reasons.  First, because trade liberalization
can change the composition of production between trading partners, estimations of
"cleaner" outcomes in one country could indeed be a direct result of "dirtier" outcomes in
another country.  Second, a trade agreement may cause trans-boundary environmental
effects that could spill over into North American territories and therefore increase
environmental problems domestically.  Third, a trade agreement could alter the impact of
trading partners on global environmental problems such as global warming, biodiversity
loss, and so forth.  Fourth, identifying more localized effects in partner countries can help
pinpoint where appropriate policy responses might be targeted to alleviate the negative
costs of trade liberalization in those countries.
2.   Expand the set of methodologies used to estimate economic impacts.
          Comprehensive ERs should draw from a variety of methods to estimate the
economic impacts of proposed trade agreements.  For the trade agreements that have
potential economy-wide effects, rather than relying solely on results from controversial
CGE models to form the "core" of their analyses, practitioners of ERs should make use of
partial equilibrium, input-output analyses, and similar techniques to estimate the primary
and secondary effects of a proposed agreement.  Isolating these important, non-
controversial areas from the more speculative and debatable equilibrating effects can
provide policy-makers with a range of economic estimates from which to base their
decisions on.
Standard CGE approaches  involve three layers of analysis, which are
conceptually distinct even if in practice somewhat collapsed into each other. First, there
is the estimate of the direct economic effects of trade liberalization, such as increased
trade in sectors where tariffs are reduced. Second, there are input-output (I-O) effects, as
changes in final demand ripple through supply chains and intermediate goods producers.
Finally, there are equilibrating changes, as markets readjust to changed conditions, prices
rise and fall, and labor moves from declining industries to expanding ones.
There is a strong tendency for studies to publish and focus on the combined
results of all three stages, including the more controversial, equilibrating effects.
Analyses of the primary and secondary effects are often embedded in the larger CGE
models – but receive far too little analytical attention on their own, and are rarely even
separately discussed in the presentation of CGE results.  Simpler, more standardized
partial equilibrium and I-O analyses can estimate these primary and secondary effects.  I-
O analysis is a well-established, straightforward process, resting on nothing more
theoretically complex than matrix multiplication (yet still rigorous and very data-
intensive).G-DAE Working Paper No. 02-01: “Economic Analysis in Environmental Reviews of Trade Agreements”
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I-O analysis was initially developed, and can easily be used, in a partial
equilibrium framework.  For instance, if analysis of the primary effects of a tariff change
in the automotive sector provides estimates that indicate that there will be the production
of fewer cars, I-O analysis can calculate the resulting decrease in auto industry inputs
from other sectors of the economy After such analyses are carried out, it can be
determined if CGE modeling is necessary to provide necessary supplementary
information.  In the ER of the US-Jordan trade agreement, CGE analysis was not needed
because the composition and scale of US-Jordan trade was relatively small and
straightforward.
If CGE work is conducted, the results should be published with full disclosure of
the embedded assumptions, and alongside the results from analyses of the primary and
secondary effects.  It is important for policy-makers and for analysts evaluating the
models to know the answers to questions like: How large are the relevant price
elasticities?  How rapidly do labor, capital, and product markets move back toward
equilibrium when perturbed in the model?  How is government assumed to respond to
changing economic conditions, and how does the government response affect the
economy?
It is important to stress that estimates of the potential economic impacts of a trade
agreement should include an examination of effects triggered by events beyond changes
in trade and tariffs. Increasingly, "trade" agreements deal with capital flows and
investment, intellectual property rights, government procurement, and a host of other
issues.  Capital flows and investment alone account for billions of dollars of transactions
in the hemisphere, and are seen by many to be a key rationale for an agreement.
However, the dominant modeling techniques are not constructed to predict the outcomes
related to these issues.
3.  Increase the number of environmental variables that are assessed.
Environmental Reviews should expand the kinds of environmental problems that
they seek to identify.  The level of quantitative sophistication in environmental modeling
has made impressive progress, but even more needs to be done.  Earlier ERs had to rely
solely on reviews of literature and educated guesses regarding the possible environmental
ramifications of different economic changes.  The most recent ERs promise to
incorporate environmental modeling techniques to estimate those impacts. At this
writing, many of the available quantitative techniques for ex-ante analysis of proposed
trade agreements fall far short of being able to identify some key environmental
problems; as a result, they need to be supplemented.  Indeed, there is a growing family of
environmental models that rely on CGE results, such as the TEAM, US-RAM, and
FARM models discussed earlier.  If the CGE results end up being erroneous, efforts to
model the environmental ramifications of those predictions will also be of little use.G-DAE Working Paper No. 02-01: “Economic Analysis in Environmental Reviews of Trade Agreements”
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A valuable initiative should be noted in this context: the US has begun efforts to
put together an "environmental baseline" scenario that will guide future ERs.  This will
allow them to determine what economic changes will affect the environment.  Other
North American governments should follow this lead.
ERs should focus on a wider range of environmental issues, including both
natural resource and pollution related problems.  NGOs and the EU reviews also seek to
identify potential socio-environmental impacts, and offer insight regarding how such
variables could also be included (WWF, 2000; Lee, 2000).  For some environmental
issues, such as air and water pollution, existing data is enough to make reliable estimates
of how such problems would be affected by trade-led economic change.  However, a
number of other problems, such as changes in land use patterns and in biodiversity, are
more difficult to quantify, especially at an aggregate level.  For these problems we
recommend conducting ex-post analyses of similar trade measures to draw out  ex-ante
lessons.  Here, the methodology conducted by NACEC serves as a great guidebook for
conducting ex-post analyses, as does the terms of reference for the World Wildlife Fund's
growing array of sustainability assessments.
In addition to assessing how trade policy may affect the environment, ERs should
continue to provide more targeted insight regarding whether a proposed trade agreement
will affect environmental regulations.  Provisions in NAFTA's controversial Chapter 11
have caused concern about the potential for "regulatory chill" that might prompt
environmental policy-makers to water down or stagnate existing regulations, in fear that
environmental standards will be challenged in investment tribunals (IISD, 2000;
Neumayer, 2001).  In addition, concerns regarding a potential "race to the bottom" due to
competitiveness and degree of environmental regulation have also resurfaced given new
evidence.  It has been suggested that Canadian's lax hazardous waste legislation has
resulted in Canada becoming a "pollution haven" for North American hazardous waste.
Similar to the empirical environmental baseline work that the US is conducting, perhaps a
regulatory baseline could be drafted that would outline environmentally friendly and
unfriendly language in potential trade agreements.  This would enable negotiators to
identify and avoid harmful language in the negotiation process.
4.  Enhance existing levels of inter-governmental and public participation.
Public participation should be built into each stage of the ER process. In recent
years, the Canadian and US government have each begun to open the trade policy-
making process to government entities, such as environment ministries, that have not
traditionally been part of trade policy.  In addition, trade policy has begun to be more
open to the public, and have a built-in response mechanism to public commentary.  These
developments should be extended to the realm of environmental reviews.
Trade policy in the US and Canada, especially as it pertains to the environment,
now involves a number of agencies and civil society representatives that have not
traditionally participated in policy-making.  Regarding inter-agency process, the USG-DAE Working Paper No. 02-01: “Economic Analysis in Environmental Reviews of Trade Agreements”
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serves as a model; in the realm of public participation, Canada does.  According to the
Executive Order governing the process in the United States, USTR and the Chair of the
Council on Environmental Quality both oversee the implementation of ERs.  In Canada,
DFAIT serves as the lead agency. Specifically, the ER process should put environmental
ministries on equal footing with trade ministries, allow public advisory committees to
participate in the development of an ER, release drafts of ERs for public and expert
review prior to final publication (as Canada does and the US has done recently), and then
respond to the latter commentary in final drafts.
Frank Ackerman is Director of the Research and Policy Program of the Global
Development And Environment Institute and Research Associate Professor at Tufts
University’s Urban and Environmental Policy Program.
Kevin Gallagher is a Research Associate on G-DAE's "Sustainable Hemispheric
Integration Project." He is a doctoral candidate in International Political Economy at
Tufts University, and holds a Masters Degree in International Environmental Policy from
Tufts.
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